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This paper is an attempt to outline the history of Swedish policies towards the energy system and to describe how the country’s economy dealt with management costs and accident risks of nuclear reactors.
When reactors supply marginal electricity, nuclear power may provide 
electrical energy at low costs, as it has high investment costs but moderate 
personal costs and low fuel costs.
The support given by the Swedish electricity consuming industry to 
nuclear power may be understood as efforts to create and defend a situation 
of overcapacity in the electricity production sector, rather than a support for 
nuclear power as such.
The external costs of routine emissions of radioactive materials are 
difficult to internalise because they, like carbon dioxide, have global long-term 
effects. However, like the air pollutants already regulated, costs of reactor 
accidents, as well as the motives for taking on management costs of nuclear 
waste are regional and within a generation in time. The market evaluation 
of accident risks has deliberately been destroyed by legislation set to favour 
nuclear reactors.
Societal economic rationality may be successfully applied in the energy 
sector. Climate change risks have been internalised through the establishment 
of carbon taxes. The resulting development of biofuels was surprisingly 
successful, indicating a potential for further modernisation of the energy 
supply system.
Possible ways to restore the nuclear risk market so that the legislation 
may internalise nuclear reactor accident risks and waste costs are described. 
This may be done without the difficult quantification of environmental costs. 
Appropriate legislation may internalise the costs while creating conditions for 
market evaluation of these uncertain costs.
Background
Sweden is a country in northern Europe. Winters require house heating, 
while summers are warm, but rarely hot. It has an energy-intensive economy. 
Although oil dependence has decreased since 1970, oil is still the largest source 
of energy. There are only a couple of countries using more hydropower per 
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capita than Sweden. Moreover, no other country has a higher per capita use 
of bioenergy. Nevertheless, more electricity is produced per capita by nuclear 
reactors here than in any other country in the world.
Reducing oil dependence is generally a popular goal of national energy 
policy. The nuclear opinion has been divided and nuclear policy has become a 
hot topic dividing the major political parties.
Anti-nuclear arguments have been based on considerations 
surrounding: reactor accidents, long-term human health effects of exposure to 
routine emissions of radioactive materials, nuclear waste, and the links between 
civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear policy was the major domestic policy issue during the mid and 
late1970s. It acted like a lightning rod for much of the political opposition, 
and brought an end to nearly forty years of uninterrupted Social Democrat 
governments. However, the most powerful industrial organisations have been 
strongly supportive of nuclear power.
Nuclear investments were started as a part of a weapons project 
[Larsson, 1985]. The process continued with industrial ambitions, but as the 
cost of nuclear power was far higher than electricity prices, the nuclear power 
project became a not only environmental and political problem but also an 
economic problem to the owners during the last 15 years of the 20th century 
[Johansson, 1986; Jasper, 1990; Kaijser, 1992].
As a political problem, the nuclear power issue could not be resolved 
in the parliamentary process, as parties were divided. Instead, a national 
referendum on nuclear power was held in March 1980. The wordings of 
the referendum ballot options were ambiguous, to say the least, although 
unwritten meanings were well understood by the voters. There were three 
alternatives to vote on. All of them stated that nuclear power should be 
decommissioned. The winning alternative stated a maximum of twelve 
reactors should be built and all of them should be closed. According to a plan 
published by the campaign, all reactors should be closed within an estimated 
twenty-five years of operation.
The politics of nuclear power in Sweden is difficult to describe in a 
consistent way. Many have tried to describe the whole political process from 
sociological or political science perspectives, focussing on the processes 
[Lindquist, 1997 (Sociology); Lundgren, 1978 (History); Lindström, 1991 
(Political Science); also Anshelm, 2000; Leijonhufvud, 1995; and, in English: 
Sahr, 1985; Jasper, 1990].
The following is an attempt to outline some of the economic interests 
and rationalities that influenced nuclear power policy in Sweden. However, 
there is also an attempt to describe a framework for market economy in the 
energy sector that may serve a socio-economical purpose. Such policy options 
are described in the latter part of the text.
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Swedish electricity sector development
Electricity production and distribution companies were established in 
several Swedish cities and industries during the period from 1880 to 1900. 
Some were based on thermal electricity generation, while others relied on 
small hydropower plants build in the minor rivers in the more populated 
southern half of Sweden. As competition was hard to sustain, the electricity 
act was developed and local electricity companies often became municipality-
owned monopolies
Exploitation of the large rivers, mostly in the less populated northern 
parts of Sweden, began in the early 1900s. Power companies with economic 
capacity to take part in this exploitation were formed by industries, by 
municipalities, and by the state. The exploitation was aided by a special 
Waterpower legislation.
Transmission lines connecting the large hydropower plants of the north 
and the population gathered in southern Sweden were built by the state. The 
local, often municipal, electricity companies, one by one, gave up electricity 
production and became distributors of electricity bought from the power 
companies. The local electricity companies turned into pseudo-independent 
retailers with little or no power of their own.
The hydro-expansion came to an end in the late 1950s. The rivers that 
could be exploited at low cost had been utilized. Those that were left required 
too large investments in relation to the electricity that could be produced. In 
addition, a rapidly growing public opinion was opposing the exploitation of 
the last few rivers flowing into the Baltic Sea, increasing the political cost of 
every new project. As a consequence, the increasing demand for electricity 
could no longer be met by new hydropower and attention turned to thermal 
power generation again.
The thermal power development provided the municipal electricity 
companies in the cities of southern Sweden with an opportunity to recover 
independence. Electricity generation using steam turbines offered the 
opportunity to use district-heating systems to utilise the cooling water. 
Revenues from district heating would give these municipal systems a 
competitive advantage over the power companies that did not have the same 
opportunity to develop district heating grids and would have to set their 
electricity price high enough to cover all the power-plant costs. The local 
electricity companies saw an opportunity to become energy companies, and 
take back market-shares lost during the hydropower era.
Such new competitors would threaten the position of the power 
companies, that could control the national power grid as well as the electricity 
price. In the battle that followed, the State-owned power-company Statens 
Vattenfallsverk, now Vattenfall, had significant market power. Vattenfall could 
stop municipal companies from selling surplus electricity to neighbouring 
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cities, and demanded exorbitantly high rates for power to be supplied in case of 
power shortage in a city that had dared to build cogeneration plants [Steen & 
Kaijser, 1990; Sintorn, 1990].
At this stage, the nuclear power option got an important role in the 
battle for power over the electricity market. If the power companies could 
present nuclear power as being able to produce electricity cheaper than 
cogeneration from fossil fuels, it would discourage investments by municipal 
power companies. 
But nuclear power has never been a low cost option. As the first reactors 
were built in the USA, and the first small Swedish reactor Ågesta was built, 
investment costs appeared too high to discourage competitors from offering 
conventional cogeneration. The Ågesta-plant should have been ready in 1961 
at a cost of 40 M SEK. It was only ready in 1964 at a cost of 205 M SEK. It 
operated at a loss until it was closed in 1974 despite the government writing-
off most of the investment cost [Leijonhufvud, 1994, p. 47]. 
The electricity intensive industry developed in Sweden under market 
conditions set by hydropower, with high investment costs and low marginal 
costs. Nuclear power also appeared to provide low marginal costs despite the 
high investments. For industrial customers, such technology may provide 
low power prices if, and only if, there is overcapacity. Once the plants are 
built, electricity will be produced and sold to prices as low as the short-term 
marginal costs.
The greater the number of power plants built, the cheaper nuclear 
plants were expected to be. In particular if a series of identical reactors could 
be build, the costs were expected to be lowered enough to make nuclear 
power plants economically competitive. In order to build series of reactors, 
perceptions of a large future demand for electricity were needed.
When asked by the power companies, industrial customers had an 
interest to provide exaggerated estimates of future energy demand in order 
to create overcapacity, and thereby to get low electricity prices. Power 
companies, on the other hand, did see such estimates as signs in support of 
their visions with large series of nuclear reactors. During the period around 
1970, projections were made that turned out to be far from the real future. In 
1972, CDL, a body coordinating the projections for the electricity producing 
industry, projected a need for 24 reactors by 1990.
Another factor encouraging electricity industry to provide high 
estimates of future energy demand was the environmentalist opposition to 
nuclear power in the beginning of the 1970’s. The anti-nuclear movement 
favoured wind power, solar energy, and biomass. Wind power and biomass 
were within economic reach. But, if projected electricity demand was high 
enough, the nuclear industry could claim that only nuclear power could meet 
the demand.
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Strong actors in favour of high electricity scenarios set the scene for the 
debate. In 1974, a governmental commission on energy projections [SOU, 
1974:64], relying heavily on information provided by the industries producing 
and consuming electricity, predicted an electricity consumption of 350 TWh 
by the year 2000. Actually, despite expanded nuclear power, real use turned 
out to be less than 145 TWh.
The over-investments in nuclear reactors that followed may be 
understood in this context of individually rational responses given economic 
situations and interests. Electricity intensive industry gave too high figures of 
future electricity need. The managers of the power companies did not critically 
analyse their figures, because the resulting projections fitted their political aims 
so well: The projections justified the idea to build large numbers of reactors 
to bring down investment costs, and the rapid demand growth showed that 
renewable energy was not sufficient.
Even before the last Swedish reactors were built after the referendum in 
1980 it was clear to many people that the demand would not create electricity 
prices that would pay the total production costs of the reactors previously 
planned [Kågeson, 1979; Millqvist, Wallin & Sterner, 1979]. Some years 
later, researchers concluded that the low–power energy plan of the antinuclear 
movement fitted real demand better than the official projection, despite none 
of the measures to reduce energy use had been adopted [Tengström, 1985].
The reactors built after the referendum, most clearly Oskarshamn III 
and Forsmark III, commissioned in 1985, have not recovered their capital 
costs to their owners. But, at least before competition was introduced, all 
reactors appeared to cover their avoidable costs, (fuel, staff and maintenance). 
Even before competition was introduced, electricity trade included markets 
for marginal power offered at prices much below average price. Assuming all 
such sales, priced around 0,1 SEK/kWh, to the older nuclear reactors, one 
may construct an analysis yielding the opposite result. Despite low priced 
marginal electricity, reactor operation was limited to prices above the short-
term marginal costs of nuclear fuel alone. Often demand was too low even at 
that price, forcing operators to turn down output of the reactors.
This was the situation in the early 1990’s, when the oldest reactors 
approached 25 years of operation, and were to be shut down according to the 
promises before the referendum and the parliamentary decision thereafter. The 
minister for Energy and Environment, Birgitta Dahl made an “irrevocable” 
commitment to close the first reactors in 1996. A well-funded campaign 
against her and the commitment was launched. In the campaign, the method 
was to mobilise the industrial trade unions against the social democratic 
government. The role of the nuclear reactor industry and the power companies 
was limited to providing “low-key information” [Wikdahl, 1991], leaving the 
battle to the electricity intensive industry and trade unions [Hibbs, 1992] 
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Electricity intensive industry in the mining, steel, chemical and pulp- 
and paper industry were key actors in this campaign. There were few companies 
involved and they perceived their economic interest to be strong. Thus they were 
easily organised and formed the Swedish Electricity Refining Industry (Sveriges 
El-förädlande Industrier) to run the campaign.
They used 31 TWh of electricity per year altogether. Overcapacity of 
electricity generators made it possible for them to buy electricity at 0,15 SEK/
kWh (approximately 2 UScent/kWh). The belief expressed, by industry as well 
as government reports at the time, was that if two reactors were shut overcapacity 
would disappear and the price would rise until it became economically justified 
to build new power plants. Electricity from any new power plant that could 
be built was said to cost the double, 0,3 SEK/kWh. The business offer by the 
campaign was the following: If the campaign just managed to delay nuclear 
decommissioning by one year, the price increase would also be postponed by 
one year. Electricity intensive industry, buying 31 TWh per year, thus would 
save 31 TWh * (0,3-0,15) SEK/kWh = 4,65 GSEK  USD 650 million. The 
possibility of delaying decommissioning would justify large investments in 
political campaigning. 
From the visible activities organised and publications made, the campaign 
budget appears to have been in the order of 10 –20 % of this amount.
Fogelström, who was executive director of the reactor producer Asea-
Atom at the time, described the success of the campaign at a meeting with the 
German Atomic Forum [Hibbs, 1992]. He concluded that the trade union 
leaders, among them Rune Molin, were impressed by the arguments and that 
Rune Molin himself was given a post in government as minister of industry 
and given the energy portfolio from Birgitta Dahl who was left with only 
the environment. The irrevocable decision became a vague ambition, and the 
economic result of the industry campaign appeared satisfactory to those who 
financed it.
 The power companies failed to recover their investments, and they lost 
expected profits of their hydropower plants because of the low electricity prices. 
At the time, the power companies were about 80% owned by taxpayers and 
retirement funds.
In 1995 the electricity market was re-regulated in order to introduce 
competition between producers. The result of the reform was a visible and falling 
electricity price. From 1998 to 2000, the price was around 0,12 SEK/kWh. The 
production costs reported by reactor companies were all well above the market 
price. With the newest reactors this was due to remaining capital costs, but the 
oldest reactors were not even able to cover avoidable costs at market price.
In 1997 a negotiated parliamentary majority made the decision to close 
one of the oldest reactors, Barsebäck I, and pay compensation to the owner, 
Sydkraft. At the same time the decision to close all reactors after 25 years of 
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operation was revoked. The second reactor at Barsebäck would be closed when 
renewable electricity and efficiency improvements would have compensated the 
loss of the capacity of the first. In the days following the decision share, values of 
all power companies increased, but the value of Sydkraft increased more than the 
others [Kåberger, 1997].
In the economic settlement that followed, taxpayers paid more than USD 
1 billion to the reactor owners.
To understand the political success of this settlement we must see how 
the decision affected the interested parties:
The power companies only profited. One of several reactors that had 
avoidable costs far above the electricity price was closed. No power company 
lost anything due to the deal. All electricity producers expected to benefit from 
a marginally increasing electricity price. The nuclear power companies won. 
The decision to close all reactors at 25 years of age was removed and, most 
important, they where given compensation for closing reactors (even for the first 
oldest reactor with avoidable costs above market price).
Shortly afterwards the vice minister for energy who handled the 
decision, Peter Nygårds, was given the job of managing director of SKB, a waste 
management company owned by the Swedish nuclear reactor owners. This 
appointment indicates that the power industry was at least not disappointed by 
the political settlement.
The power intensive industry may have disliked the risk of a short-
term marginal price increase due to reduced over-capacity.  However with the 
integrated electricity market including more countries than Sweden, the effect of 
closing one minor reactor was small. Revoking the decision to close all the other 
reactors after 25 years of operation was more important. The capacity loss would 
have been large enough in relation to transmission capacity in northern Europe 
to have an effect on prices in Sweden.
Many active nuclear opponents celebrated that the decommissioning 
started, and in political rhetoric statements, government spokesmen made 
successful efforts to support this image of the deal.
The taxpayers who had to pay the compensation to the reactor owners are 
a large number of individuals, who each lost a moderate sum of money. Such an 
interest is difficult to organise enough to even understand, and less to be able to 
defend their interests.
Barsebäck I was closed in 1999. In order to continue the 
decommissioning of the other reactor at Barsebäck, electricity production of the 
first reactor was to be substituted by renewable supply or improved efficiency. 
This was achieved in a few years. The reactors produced an average of 3,5 and 
4 TWh each while in operation. Between 2000 and 2005 annual electricity 
production from bioenergy alone increased more than 4 Twh. In addition, wind 
power increased by half a TWh. See diagram 2 and 3.
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Consequently, Barsebäck II was closed in 2005. A similar 
compensation arrangement to the owner was applied.
The remaining nuclear power plants, comprising 10 reactors in 
total, are currently in operation. No further decisions have been made on 
continued decommissioning. The present government has explicitly stated 
that no decisions will be taken during their term in office.
Partly due to carbon emission constraints, electricity prices have 
increase in Europe. As a result nuclear power plants are no longer an 
economic burden on the owners. The owners are instead investing in 
modernisation of the plants and some have been allowed to increase their 
generating power. If all plans are carried out, the increased power of the 
remaining reactors may be as large as the capacity lost when the two small 
Barsebäck reactors were closed.
This appears to be economically rational. One may see the operation 
costs of the older and smaller reactors as to high too justify continued 
operation, while the newer and larger ones were too expensive to build but 
possible to operate with defensible operating costs. New reactors are not 
profitable investments, but a marginal increase in the best existing reactors 
may appear profitable.
So the decision by the political leadership to close Barsebäcks reactors 
may appear economically rational in a narrow sense. But there are other 
relevant factors.
Barsebäck is situated near Sweden’s third largest city, Malmö, and just 
across the Öresund straight from København, the capital of neighbouring 
Denmark. A reactor accident in Barsebäck could have greater economic 
and social consequences than around other Swedish nuclear plants situated 
further away from large population centres.
Secondly, Barsebäck staff showed safety related behaviour that raised 
concerns from the safety authority for many years.
While no other nuclear power plant in Sweden is as badly located, 
another plant is beginning to catch attention for similar problems with safety 
culture among its staff. Forsmark nuclear power plant that used to be seen as 
the best performing nuclear plant is under investigation for illegal breaking 
of safety regulation. The plant is now under special surveillance by the 
authority, and one reactor has been closed for safety reasons.
From planned decommissioning to market solutions
There has been a shift in the focus of monetary transactions from 
decommissioning to market solutions. However, the energy sector has 
significant external economic effects that are lost in such analysis. The 
extended operation time of the remaining reactors will lead to a net increase 
in nuclear operation and associated costs:
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Diagram 1. Bioenergy use in Sweden from 1970 to 2006, in TWh. Most of the bioenergy 
is used for heating industrial processes or houses via district heating grids. In 




















Diagram 2. Electricity production from biomass in Sweden from 1983 to 2005.
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An increased number of expected cancer cases and genetic risks will occur 
due to routine emissions of radioactive material, mostly from uranium mining. 
These costs affect mainly people in other countries and in future generations. 
Cancer is nowadays often possible to treat successfully for those who are able to 
detect it early and who have economic resources to pay for treatment.
Rational economic men of power in present industrial societies may 
undervalue these effects. However, a socio-economic analysis giving equal 
appreciation of cost regardless of where and when people suffer from such 
effects may assess these costs as significantly larger.
Longer periods of reactor increase the risks of accident. The significance 
of such risks is difficult to quantify. The costs have been lifted off the shoulders 
of the operators and placed on tax-payers and potential accident victims by the 
special legislation on nuclear liability. In this case, a large number of people 
carry a low probability of a significant cost.
More nuclear waste will be produced. Nuclear waste management is 
believed to pose external costs only to coming generations. Members of these 
generations cannot influence present decision-making. However, in economic 
theory, though not necessarily in politics, consequences are important even if 
they do not have well organised interest groups to give them attention. The 
general principle is that those who cause environmental costs also shall pay 
the costs. If they do not pay the victims directly, they shall pay the cost as a 
tax [Pigou, 1920]. This is the position taken not only by environmentalists 
but also by economists and by international organisations in documents like 
Agenda 21 [UN, 1992, eg article 4.24] and WEC [WEC, 1995].
In the following, we shall briefly look at how internalisation of external 
costs of fossil fuels by environmental taxation was done in Sweden. This policy 
was successfully implemented and it favoured nuclear power interests. Finally, 
we shall look at the potential for applying economic theory to the regulation of 
nuclear power itself.
Pricing carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels
From the time of the first oil crises in 1973 there has been a genuine 
policy to reduce oil dependence in Sweden agreed by all political parties.  
Subsidies and support for oil have been systematically removed and energy 
taxes on fossil fuels were increased.
As climate policy added another driving force to reduce fossil fuel use, 
a carbon tax on fossil fuels was introduced in Sweden in 1990 [Jonsson et al., 
1997]. Diagram 1 shows the most significant effect of this policy, the increased 
use of bioenergy. Bioenergy corresponds to about a quarter of all energy use in 
Sweden in 2005. 
Since the introduction of the carbon tax, bioenergy has been a more 
competitive alternative to oil and coal in all new large plants. As the use of 
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bioenergy increased, surprisingly to some, prices of solid biofuels fell. There 
appeared to be no shortage of resources while the methods of preparing and 
transporting biomass for energy purposes improved significantly.
During the following decade, bioenergy use increased by about three 
TWh per year. And in 2006, preliminary data from the energy authority says 
bioenergy contributed 118 TWh in Sweden, significantly more energy than 
the 65 TWh of electricity produced in the nuclear reactors.
Sweden is one of the countries in the world where new technologies 
to produce and use refined bioenergy have been developed. Wood pellets to 
be used in small pellet burners have increased in popularity, and technologies 
for integrated biomass gasification and combined cycle electricity generation 
has been developed and demonstrated in Sweden [Ståhl & Nergaard, 1998].
While much of the planning for more bioenergy were projecting 
energy plantations and competition with forest industry supplies, market 
conditions stimulated supply of residues from the timber industry and 
residues from forestry [Kåberger, 1997].
In this case there was a clear policy to reduce the use of fossil fuels 
and increase the use of bioenergy. Removing subsidies and imposing 
environmental tax on competing fossil fuels created conditions for growth, a 
demand for research results and information on bioenergy was well received, 
as using bioenergy was profitable. 
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Behind the introduction of the carbon tax in the period around 
1990, there were mutually supporting interests of the nuclear reactor-
owners and the environmental movement. As described above, nuclear 
power in Sweden suffered from over-capacity. Reactors were operating 
at reduced power because the electricity they could produce was not in 
demand even at short-term marginal cost prices. The power companies 
were looking for ways to increase demand for electricity. The only option 
that could provide a large demand increase in a short period of time was 
to increase electric resistance heating. At the time, oil and coal were the 
competing sources of heat that electricity could win market shares from as 
a result of fossil fuel taxation.
Environmentalists had asked for a general carbon tax on all carbon 
emitted from fossil fuels. However, from the point of view of the electricity 
producers who wanted to increase the sales of electricity for heating 
purposes, this would not be attractive. Heating demand peaks in winter 
when hydro and nuclear capacity cannot satisfy power demand. With a 
carbon tax on the fossil-based electricity production, marginal cost pricing 
would make electric resistance heating very expensive.
Instead, a carbon tax that applied to fossil fuels used to produce 
heat, but not to fossil fuels used to produce electricity, was introduced. As 
described above, it was successful in introducing bioenergy-technology and 
increased the use of bioenergy sufficiently to bring down its costs. But there 
are unintended consequences that deserve to be mentioned:
If electricity is produced from steam and the waste heat is dumped 
into the sea, no carbon tax is paid on the fuel. However, if the waste heat 
is supplied to the district heating grid, then a carbon tax is assessed for the 
fraction of the fuel ending up as commercial heat. As the carbon tax on coal is 
higher than the price of coal, this was a disaster for fossil fuelled cogeneration 
plants that competed with less efficient fossil-based electricity production. 
Recalling the battle between local energy companies, attempting to expand 
cogeneration and the power companies, this appears as another political 
victory for the power companies.
Since 2003 a system of green certificates on renewable electricity has 
supported the use of bioenergy for electricity production ensuring no fossil 
fuels are used in cogeneration plants [Kåberger et al., 2004].
Potential regulation of the economic liability for nuclear 
reactor accidents
In 1957, studies at the Brookhaven national laboratory in the USA on 
behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission described catastrophic consequences 
of an accident in a civil nuclear power plant [Beck et al., 1957]
The nuclear industry in the US came to the conclusion that if the 
nuclear industry had to carry the economic liability for reactor accidents there 
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would be no commercial nuclear power. To avoid these costs, the industry 
asked a group of legal experts to provide a proposal for a legislation that would 
make nuclear power profitable by socialising the costs of potential accidents. 
The proposal, [Murphy et. al, 1957] and the resulting law called the Price-
Anderson Act after the two politicians that brought it forward, has served 
as blueprints for nuclear accident legislation in all countries that have private 
nuclear power reactors. The key elements are:
1. In case of a nuclear reactor accident there is only one company or 
person that can be held liable and that is the operator.
This is important, as all suppliers are relieved of the risk that 
faulty equipment or mistakes during construction could imply economic 
consequences, were they to cause a reactor accident. Without this component 
in the legislation all suppliers to nuclear power plants would have to keep 
higher prices to cover the costs of accident liabilities their mistakes could cause.
2. The economic liability of the operator in case of a major reactor 
accident is strictly limited to an amount far below the potential 
costs of a major accident.
This component in the legislation has two important aspects. Without a 
limited accident liability the operator would face bankruptcy in case of a major 
accident. To banks considering lending money to an operating company, that 
risk of bankruptcy would be a reason to increase interest rates to compensate 
for their risk of loosing the money in case of an accident. Increased interest 
rates would lead to higher costs and less competitiveness of nuclear power.
In Sweden, the law was based on a government commission on nuclear 
liability. They justified the subsidy by arguing “that it is necessary to utilise 
nuclear power – at any cost – if we are to avoid economic decline” [SOU, 
1959:34 p.25].
The introduction of the liability legislation is an expression of decisive 
energy policy. The law has immediate and significant economic implications 
for the competitiveness of an energy technology.
One can imagine an alternative to this legislation, the kind imposed 
on automobile owners. It was discovered, when automobiles became popular, 
that there were people who could afford to buy and drive a car, but who were 
unable to pay for the costs resulting from car accidents they might cause. 
Allowing the drivers to escape paying caused a societal problem of deciding 
how to compensate the victims of the accidents. As a result, most countries 
have introduced a legislation of compulsory insurance for cars to be allowed on 
the streets – an insurance that should cover the total cost of very rare accidents 
that may cost from 100 to 10 000 times the price of a car.
A country with a desire to establish a fair competitive electricity market 
may choose to impose similar legislation for nuclear reactors. The maximum 
amount of money that is necessary to compensate all victims of a nuclear 
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accident may be in the order of several thousand billion US dollars (1 000 
000 000 000). According to public statements by the governments of Ukraine 
and Byelorussia, the costs of the Chernobyl accident are in the order of some 
hundred billion dollars.
A thousand billion dollars cannot be easily paid by any state budget. 
Not even in a large country in which cost is easily distributed. The Chernobyl 
accident was a good reason for the relatively rich Russia to withdraw from the 
Soviet Union when costly consequences of the accident occurred in the poorer 
parts of the Union: Ukraine and Byelorussia.
It is possible to find insurance-like solutions to share such risks via the 
international capital markets. Radetzki & Radetzki [2000] describe how this 
could be done. Operators could be forced to sell catastrophe bonds to collect 
enough capital to compensate victims of large accidents. Such bonds would lose 
all their value in case of a reactor accident, and in order to find voluntary capital, 
the reactor operator would have to pay an extra premium interest on the bonds.
By compulsory arrangements of this kind there would be a market 
value created for nuclear accident risks. This risk cost would have to be paid 
by nuclear power operators, reducing their competitiveness in relation to new 
energy technologies.
Anti-nuclear policy in Sweden has gone as far at to close down a 
working reactor by law. But the parliament has not gone on to withdraw the 
accident liability subsidy in the legislation. 
Economic liability for nuclear waste costs
When a nuclear reactor is taken into operation and is contaminated 
by radioactivity, decommissioning the plant and storing the radioactive 
components will generate future costs. If we include the cost of managing 
used nuclear fuel of thousands of generations into the future, the cost of waste 
management, the back-end cost of a nuclear reactor may be higher than the 
cost of building the power plant.
Direct costs of nuclear waste management may not be all of, or even the 
most important part of, total costs. Waste accidents and resulting radioactive 
emissions, future sabotage or deliberate use of fissile material produced in 
the reactors to construct nuclear weapons may cause significant consequences 
thousands of years into the future.
There are uncertainties about what methods may be used and thus on 
what the real costs of waste management will be. An interesting lesson was 
learnt as the British government prepared for privatisation of nuclear power 
plants in 1987. The private investors considering taking over the plants and 
operating them on a competitive electricity market significantly changed the 
estimates of decommissioning and waste management. There was roughly a 
tenfold increase in estimated future costs [see MacKerron, 1991].
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When uncertainties are as large, as in the case of nuclear waste 
management, the conditions under which the cost estimates are made 
are important. Prior to the attempted privatisation in Britain, the nuclear 
reactors were operated by a government monopoly. The people of the nuclear 
department of this monopoly had all interest in producing low cost estimates 
of waste management. Low waste costs would make nuclear power appear 
more competitive and increase the chances of more investments and a growing 
nuclear department. And it was not a problem for them if the estimates proved 
too low. The monopoly-company could just raise their prices to raise the 
money necessary to manage the waste. If that would prove impossible they may 
rely on the owners of the reactors and waste problem: the taxpayers.
The private investors were in an entirely different situation. They had 
no reason to underestimate the waste cost. They only wanted the best possible 
estimate to be able to place a bid that was high enough to get the reactors but 
low enough to ensure future profit. On the other hand, they knew they would 
face a competitive electricity market. Thus they also knew that they would not 
be able to increase electricity prices to raise the necessary money to handle the 
waste in the future. They also knew that they would not like to turn to the 
owners. The owners would be the investors themselves.
The real management costs in the future will also depend on how 
dangerous radioactive pollution will turn out to be in the future. During the 
last few decades of radioactive contamination, knowledge of cancer risks and 
genetic effects have accumulated slowly. It may prove relevant to distinguish 
between effects of external radiation caused by distant nuclear explosions or 
X-ray machines on the one hand and doses caused to a particular cell by a 
decay chain of ingested radioactive pollution built into the body on the other. 
Such distinctions may provide an understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
leukaemia clusters found around reprocessing plants in Europe [Gardner et al., 
1990; Guizard et al., 2001].
The established scientific organisations like the International 
Commission on Radiation Protection, ICRP, has increased their risk estimates 
step by step, with the cancer risk increasing by the order of ten during the last 
thirty years.
As the risk estimates increase, more safety measures are required 
when handling waste. More expensive waste storage facilities are needed, and 
bringing waste into the storage becomes more expensive as workers protection 
makes handling waste more difficult.
It is important for the fair competition with new sources of energy that 
these management costs are not socialised. But that is not enough to assure 
proper economic management of radioactive waste.
Due to the long periods of time involved, nuclear industry can assume 
that by the time waste has to be managed or damages from waste miss-
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management occur, the nuclear companies will no longer exist. In Sweden the 
nuclear waste management costs are supposed to be covered by the nuclear 
reactor operators. The owners of the nuclear power plants have formed limited 
liability companies owning the reactors and holding all liabilities connected 
to the power plant. As long as they are profitable, profits are passed on to the 
owners. However, when the reactors are closed and only waste costs remain, 
they may file for bankruptcy. Due to the strict limited liability legislation, the 
owner would be able to escape from the real costs.
The Swedish parliament had previously imposed legislation forcing 
the owners to contribute to a waste management fund under government 
supervision that should cover planned costs for nuclear waste management.
In a government commission in 1994, we discovered that this system 
was insufficient. Cost estimates were so uncertain that there was a need 
to have the industry provide reliable paying capacity to cover at least the 
potential management costs during the coming century. As these costs were 
uncertain they could not easily justify further fund accumulation beyond 
the planned costs. Instead, the industry was supposed to provide economic 
securities that could be used if real costs became larger than the planned 
costs already covered by money accumulated in the fund [Reported in SOU, 
1994:107/108]. These economic securities are now in the order of a 
billion USD.
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